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NSC-68 AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.
-Carl von Clausewitz
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To today's generation of senior military leaders, Clausewitz' dictum is as recognizable as the monthly Leave and Earnings Statement. Over years of professional military education, officers are formally exposed, perhaps overexposed, to Clausewitz at virtually every pay grade.
Yet, when one objectively views the variety of enemies and agendas being prosecuted under the Global War on Terrorism umbrella, can we honestly say we are acting in accordance with
Clausewitz' advice? 2 What is the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? It is certainly global. As Jeffrey Record points out, American enemies in the GWOT include terrorist organizations at the national, regional, and global level, rogue states, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, and failed states that either knowingly or unknowingly harbor terrorists. 3 To lump this expanse of geography, peoples, and issues solely under the rubric of terrorism is a gross simplification that can only lead to an unfocused and confused strategy. Rogue states are an issue, and the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and North Korea are national security concerns, but the strategy to deal with these states should not be tied to the GWOT.
These issues deserve their own analysis and unique justification for action. As the American experience in Iraq seems to show, anything less is a recipe for international disapproval, domestic confusion, and unfocused action. The U.S. has many vexing problems around the world, and as the September 11 attacks come into better focus, it is clear that they
are not all directly related to the GWOT. The time has come to perform an objective inventory of these problems and deal with them in accordance with their own nature.
For the GWOT, this means culling many ancillary and distracting missions and discovering just who and what the enemy truly is. In military operations, the first step in planning is called "Mission Analysis." A proper mission analysis is the foundation used to come to grips with the nature of the problem, specified and implied tasks, assumptions, and finally, a mission statement. In the quest for action in the GWOT, from the Interagency level and up, the United States has garbled mission analysis for three years, leading to unfocused action and over-reliance on the military instrument of power.
A recurring theme from the recently completed 9/11 Commission Report was "nobody is in charge." 4 While the President of the United States and hundreds of thousands of others are diligently working and fighting in the GWOT, on a day-to-day basis, nobody is truly in charge of the GWOT, and there is no overarching plan to define the threats and the ends, ways, and means to deal with them. Half a century ago, the United States faced the similar issue of a rising, largely unanticipated threat-communism. The National Security Act of 1947 established a framework for the President "to coordinate foreign policy and defense policy, and to reconcile diplomatic and military commitments and requirements." 5 This act gave the President the organizational power and tools to more effectively focus and achieve unified action across the government. This legislation brought into existence the Department of Defense, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. 6 President Harry Truman was the first president to harness the power of this reorganization. On 31 January 1950, Truman directed the newly formed National Security Council to conduct "a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans." 7 On 7 April 1950, NSC-68 was completed and delivered.
NSC-68, a report to the National Security Council, became the document that laid the philosophical framework for how the United States would respond to the communist threat. 8 Over the years, NSC-68 was accepted as the course of action "America must pursue for as long as it is a global power…a statement of the need for America to conduct a security policy in which foreign policy and military policy are closely coordinated, and a plea to devote adequate resources to both." 9 Pundits note the lack of any governmental thinking today which approaches the level and coherence attained by Paul Nitze and his group in 1950. 10 NSC-68 was a strategic level mission analysis that determined the ends, ways, and means of countering the communist threat. The framework and the systematic approach of NSC-68 were simple and straightforward. Complementing the methodology was Nitze's masterful staffing and consensus building for the document throughout the government. 11 The federal government has changed, however, and the interagency of today is the morbidly obese descendant of 1950. The task, however, is no less important now than it was then, and the requirement for an integrated interagency approach to the GWOT remains unfulfilled. In this sense, NSC-68 may have great utility today. This paper explores that notion in greater depth. Can an NSC-68 styled "Mission Analysis" of the GWOT provide the government with the clarity and direction needed to achieve unified action in its prosecution?
LIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
NSC-68 began with a background of the communist crisis, and then moved on to discuss the fundamental purposes of the United States and the Soviet Union, underlying conflicts, and the intentions and capabilities of both parties. Finally, the report identified risks, atomic weapons considerations, and possible courses of action. This paper will adopt a similarly systematic approach, beginning with the background of events leading up to September 11,
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, followed by a discussion of the strategic objectives of both the United States and its adversary, the most likely enemy course of action, and finally a proposed strategic approach and recommendations. While not following NSC-68 in a lockstep manner, the paper will follow its spirit in the hopes of providing direction for a conflict whose length will soon surpass that of U.S. involvement in World War II.
BACKGROUND OF THE CURRENT CRISIS
To understand the current crisis, we must begin with an accurate definition of the enemy.
The enemy is not terrorism, which is merely a tactic. As the dialogue is beginning to reflect, a "war on terrorism" is like calling World War II a "war on blitzkrieg and kamikazes." 12 The United
States is fighting people who use terror as a tactic-but that is not a good enough distinction 
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES AND RADICAL ISLAM
NSC-68 spelled out the fundamental purpose of the United States: "to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual."
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Half a century later, the National Security Strategy of the United States remains consistent with that message, and is "based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity." 22 The aim of the radical Islamist can best be derived from a definition. Repeatedly, when discussing the power of the Islamists, the passive acceptance of the majority of Muslims is noted. Passivity among the masses is power given to the vocal minority.
This is a religion so confused with its place in the world that its members will tolerate a fatwa issued against author Salman Rushdie for passages in The Satanic Verses; yet remain stone silent in this regard with Osama bin Laden, a man who has done incalculable damage to Islam, and yet is actually a hero to millions. 31 The Islamists have no Gross Domestic Product, stock market, or other conventional economic indicators; nevertheless, they do have an ability to influence economies. Markets rise and fall on Islamist terror activities, and the friction of the GWOT has certainly driven oil prices higher, and absorbed billions of dollars in force protection measures and direct combat. The global economy reacted directly to the September 11 attacks, and future attacks may well include financial nodes. Still, as expensive as the GWOT is, the long term impact of radical
Islam on the global economy is the equivalent of crop damage-catastrophic to some individuals, but overall, merely a nuisance.
A dar al-Islam , an Islamic territory which absorbs a group of Muslim nations, could be another matter. 32 Petro-dollars and radical Islam would be a potent combination, allowing tremendous economic clout-some would argue that Saudi Arabia today is such a country.
With Iran, the world has seen the ability of an Islamic theocracy with deep pockets to destabilize the region somewhat; yet, the market for Iranian oil is rock solid. A Persian Gulf lined with likeminded countries could have frightening power.
Radical Islam has no conventional military or fielded forces. This is a strength in the sense that they can never be definitively defeated. Following classic Maoist guerilla theory, the Islamist can hide in a sea of people and engage when and where he chooses. As long as the people permit their presence, their military capability will remain. Eventually in Maoist theory, however, a guerilla force must become conventional in order to seize power. The United
States, the most powerful conventional force in the world, would love to see such an occurrence-which is precisely why it will not happen. As a 1992 RAND study describes future U.S. adversaries, they "will no more seek to confront U.S. power on U.S. terms than David would have gone out against Goliath with a sword and shield." 33 The radical Islamist movement has, of necessity, gone in an asymmetric direction, relying on non-conventional forces, decentralized organization, and suicide attacks. Chillingly, Islamists have also come to the same conclusion as the Indian diplomat who remarked that the main lesson of 1991's Gulf War was "never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons." 34 There is a hierarchy within the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) classification, and everything else places a distant second to nuclear weapons. By all accounts the Holy Grail of
Islamists-if they get it, the United States must assume they will use it. The deterrence theory so highly evolved in the Cold War is muddied when dealing with a stateless enemy, who may not be able to be deterred at all. A nuclear attack on the United States may provide Islamic terrorists with a high payoff. Despite all the efforts to destroy them, the terrorists would prove themselves alive and dangerous. This event would likely gain Islamists as much credibility (and acclaim) within the Muslim world as it would disgust-there is little doubt that some Muslims would literally dance in the streets following such a cataclysm. Beyond the Muslim world, the Islamists may gain as much as they lose as well. It is hard to imagine the United States not retaliating in kind-against someone. In the emotional aftermath of a nuclear attack on American soil, it is likely that U.S. leaders would not make coldly rational decisions. Even if the right target were found, any nuclear response would provide additional benefit to the Islamist cause. A U.S. nuclear exchange in the Middle East would be the final exclamation point on a half century of American meddling in the region, making the Islamist case on the continuing crusade against Islam, and the ultimately catastrophic influence of the West.
U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH
NSC-68 described American intentions as "designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community." 35 Nothing has changed in this basic outlook over the past half century, and the rhetoric is entirely consistent with the U.S. stance on globalization.
In dealing with Islamist terrorism, "containment" is problematic. In the Cold War, neither side ever directly attacked the other, due to the risk of nuclear escalation. Having been attacked today, U.S. policy is to kill Islamist terrorists on their territory. It is an aggressive policy long on military kinetic energy, and short on the other instruments of national power. 36 With the President's stated "you're either with us or against us" policy, the United States is prosecuting an incredibly complex and vague war with the presupposed clarity of the Cold War.
As a result, a large portion of the U.S. government is underemployed in the GWOT. In Packaging and integrating a much more grand strategy through the informational instrument of power is an enormous and essential task left yet undone and mostly unstarted. 39 In its voluminous report, the Task Force on Strategic Communications clearly places the onus of communication on the President of the United States, while outlining a governmental effort of massive scope to focus an information campaign on the GWOT. Indeed, the report goes beyond the GWOT, stating "we must understand the United States is engaged in a generational and global struggle about ideas, not a war between the West and Islam. It is more than a war against the tactic of terrorism." 40 Strategic communications must be aimed domestically and internationally. The GWOT is politicized and unfocused. To deal with the Islamist enemy, the U.S. must plainly label them, distinguish them from the war in Iraq, and build support for action against them based on national goals of global interdependence and human rights.
In the words of President Bush, "this is hard work," and not necessarily politically popular. 42 The Islamist vision does not agree with human nature. Draconian theocracies lose something in the translation from revolutionary fervor to normalcy. There are no success stories: the Taliban were a failed government, and the final adjustment in Iran and Sudan has yet to occur. Radical
Islam will run its course through this period of resurgence, and ultimately wane-the requirement for the United States is to do everything in its power to hasten the process and lessen Islamist impact. This demands a strategy that harnesses and synchronizes the U.S.
instruments of power. Accordingly, the following recommendations are offered:
• Refocus and strengthen U.S. military prosecution of the GWOT. The U.S. had great success in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere; however, the war in Iraq greatly confused and diluted these efforts. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea are (were) rogue states with only vague ties to Islamist terror, and the U.S. has squandered GWOT clarity, momentum, and legitimacy in bringing these countries into the GWOT discussion. Greater interagency participation will likely require governmental reorganization. This should be done thoughtfully. Reorganizing is a painful and drawn out evolution with no guarantee of success, and should not be attempted as a knee-jerk attempt to "do something." If the instruments of national power are the tools for fighting the GWOT, then the war should be fought from the cabinet level of government rather than the combatant command level. The
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was tremendously effective at reorganizing the Department of Defense in order to achieve unified action among the armed forces. A similar approach is needed today aimed at the cabinet level of government to harness all agencies to pull as one against threats requiring more than a predominately military approach. The Department of Homeland Security was established after the September 11 th attacks to protect the U.S.
domestically. A logical next step may establish a "Department of International Security," which recognizes that threats are best dealt with preemptively and far from American soil through nation-building efforts. Any reorganization must encompass cogent and integrated strategic communications.
adversary to date has not been Al Qaeda, but rather the United States itself. The failure of the U.S. Government at the interagency level and above to communicate, organize, and focus this war has severely limited the power this country is capable of exerting. Half a century ago, NSC-68 provided a simple yet elegant mechanism to bring about U.S. unity of effort in fighting the Cold War. Today, the U.S. government would be wise to put away the platitudes, put together a planning team, and try this approach again.
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